Abstract-We consider the problem of resilient state estimation in the presence of integrity attacks. There are m sensors monitoring the state and p of them are under attack. The sensory data collected by the compromised sensors can be manipulated arbitrarily by the attacker. The classical estimators, such as the least squares estimator, may not provide a reliable estimate under the so-called (p, m)-sparse attack. In this paper, we are not restricting our efforts to studying whether any specific estimator is resilient to the attack or not, but instead we aim to present some generic sufficient and necessary conditions for resilience by considering a general class of convex optimization based estimators. The sufficient and necessary conditions are shown to be tight, with a trivial gap. We further specialize our result to the scalar sensor measurements case and extend our framework to incorporate estimators with correlated cost function optimization. Experimental results tested on the IEEE 14-bus test system validate the theoretical analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
C YBER-PHYSICAL security has drawn increasing research attention [1] - [5] since the first Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system malware (called Stuxnet) was discovered and investigated [6] , [7] . One important class of attacks is known as integrity attack on the sensory data. Due to the sparse spatial deployment of the sensors, full protection during the collection and transmission of the sensory data cannot often be guaranteed. The attacker launches an attack in industrial systems for various purposes, such as creating arbitrage opportunities in electricity market, stealing gas or oil without being noticed, posing potential threats to national defense, etc. Briefly speaking, the dominant feature of an integrity attack is that the attacker can take full control of a subset of sensors and can arbitrarily change the measurements. One way to deal with malicious measurements is to treat them as bad data or outliers. In the context of power systems, the problem of bad data detection has been studied over the past decades [8] , [9] . The method of checking the magnitude of residue is useful for identifying random bad data or outliers but may not work for intentional integrity attacks [10] - [14] . For example, Liu et al. [15] successfully showed that a stealthy attack changing the state while not being detected is possible. Kim et al. [16] studied a so-called framing attack. Under such an attack, the bad data detector is misled to delete those critical measurements, without which the network is unobservable and a covert attack may be launched. Bad data detectors and attackers are analogous to an antivirus software and Trojan. Apparently, any defensive strategy always falls behind the development of new attacks. Since bad measurements are not likely to be fully eliminated, resilient estimation is necessary for cyber-physical systems. A thorough study of resilient estimators based on the worst case measurements is thus urgently needed.
In the worst case, the estimator receives a mixture of good and malicious measurements but it knows nothing about how attacks are launched and which measurements are reliable. In statistics, the worst case estimation is studied with the concept of robust estimators [17] - [19] . The robustness is often measured by influence functions [20] or breakdown points [21] , [22] , which is the proportion of incorrect observations an estimator can handle before giving an incorrect (e.g., arbitrarily large) result. In most of the above-mentioned research works, the measurement is usually a scalar, which may not be applicable for many control systems with vector measurements. Recently, Fawzi et al. [23] showed a fundamental result on the largest number of errors that can be handled by some decoder in a vector linear system. The system, however, is assumed to be noiseless in these cases. Pajic et al. [24] extended the work [23] by considering the systems with bounded noise. On the top of sufficient conditions for exact recovery in noiseless case [23] , they showed that the worst error is still bounded even under an attack. However, their estimator is based on a combinatorial optimization problem, which in general is computationally hard to solve and may not be applicable for large-scale systems. In [25] , Pajic et al. derived an estimator based on solving an l 1 optimization problem. However, the bounds that they derive are conservative when there are multiple sensors being attacked. In [26] and [27] , Mo et al. and Mo and Garone also considered a noisy linear system and used the reachability analysis and ellipsoid approximation to characterize all possible biases the adversary can inject into the system.
Most aforementioned literature studied one or several estimators and discussed the breakdown point properties, and a unified analysis for most useful estimators is still absent. Considering different behaviors of various estimators under the integrity attacks, we target for proposing a unified resilience analysis framework integrating most commonly used estimators.
In the subsequent sections, we focus on the problem of resilient state estimation against sparse integrity attacks. To be concrete, we consider estimating a vector state x ∈ R n from measurements collected by m sensors, where the measurements are subjected to any random noise. For practical reasons, the spatially distributed sensors cannot be fully guaranteed to be secure. Some of them may be controlled by the attacker and due to the resource limitation, the attacker can only attack up to p < m sensors. Without posing any restrictions on the attacker, we assume that the compromised sensory data can be arbitrarily changed. In this paper, we consider an static state estimation that has wide applications, such as power systems and smart grid. Moreover, the main results introduced later provide fundamental insights on the counterpart for the dynamical systems that we are still investigating. We now summarize our main contributions as follows.
1) We integrate most commonly used estimators in a generic form of convex optimization based estimators and conduct the resilience analysis over a large class of estimators. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time to study the cyber-physical security problem in a unified approach rather than focus on a concrete estimator. 2) By formally defining the resilience of an estimator, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions on the resilience of such a general estimator. The paramount significance of this paper is that the novel analytical methodology presented in this manuscript can be used for characterizing and designing a specific resilient estimator in the presence of compromised sensory data. 3) From a practical point of view, we also provide some verifiable sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for the resilience of the estimator in the scalar measurement case. 4) Our framework can also deal with a class of estimators involving correlated cost function optimization. A preliminary version of this paper was presented in [28] . Relative to this early version, we provide a more comprehensive literature review. We also report a detailed proof to the results, such as Theorem 2. More analysis has been presented for the scalar case in Section IV and the correlated cost function case in Section V. Furthermore, extensive simulations are also conducted for better illustration.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the resilient estimation problem. Our main results on the resilience of a general convex optimization based estimator is presented in Section III. We specialize our results for a scalar sensor case in Section IV. We extend our result for a correlated cost function in Section V. The simulation results and concluding remarks are given in Sections VI and VII.
II. PROBLEM SETUP

A. System Model
Assume that m sensors are measuring the state x and the measurement equation for the ith sensor is given by the following:
where x ∈ R n is the state of interest, z i ∈ R m i is the "true" measurement collected by the ith sensor, and w i ∈ R m i is the measurement noise for the ith sensor. The measurement matrix
( i m i )×n is assumed to be observable, i.e., H is full column rank. In the presence of attacks, the measurement equation can be written as follows:
where y i ∈ R m i is the "manipulated" measurement and a i ∈ R m i is the attack vector. In other words, the attacker can change the measurement of the ith sensor by a i . Denote 1) a i = 0, ∀i ∈ I c ; and 2) |I| ≤ p. Define the collection of all possible index sets of malicious sensors as follows:
The set of all possible (p, m)-sparse attacks is denoted as follows:
The main task of this paper is to investigate the sufficient and necessary conditions for a generic convex optimization based estimator to be resilient to (p, m)-sparse attacks. To this end, we first formally define the resilience of an estimator.
Definition 2 (Resilience): An estimator g : R i m i → R n that maps the measurements y to a state estimatex is said to be resilient to the (p, m)-sparse attack if it satisfies the following condition:
where μ : R i m i → R is a real-valued mapping on z. Remark 1: One robustness measure for an estimation in statistics is breakdown point [22] . The reasons for the introduction of the new definition of resilience are twofold. First, the sensor measurement is a vector instead of a scalar. Second the sensors are inhomogeneous, i.e., the observation matrices are different across sensors.
The resilience implies that the disturbance on the state estimate caused by an arbitrary attack is bounded. A trivial resilient estimator is g(y) = 0, which provides very poor estimate. Therefore, another desirable property for an estimator is translation invariance, which is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Translation invariance): An estimator g is translation invariant if g(y + Hu) = u + g(y), ∀u ∈ R n . Remark 2: Notice that if an estimator is resilient and translation invariant, then
where the attack vector a can take any value from A. The term μ(w) is the maximum bias for all possible attack a. Hence, it does not depend on a.
In Section II-B, we propose a general convex optimization based estimator that is translation invariant.
B. General Convex Estimator
A large variety of estimators are developed by the research community to solve the state estimation problem. In order to achieve greater generality, we first propose a general convex optimization based estimator. We then show that many estimators can be rewritten in this general framework.
The estimator that we study in this paper is assumed to have the following form:
where the following properties of function f i : R m i → R are assumed:
1) f i is convex; 2) f i is symmetric, i.e., f i (u) = f i (−u); and 3) f i is nonnegative and f i (0) = 0. Remark 3: One can view y i − H ix as the residue for the ith sensor and f i as a cost function. The convex constraints on f i ensure that the minimization problem can be solved in an efficient (possibly also distributed) fashion. The symmetric assumption on f i is typically true for many practically used estimator and can actually be relaxed, which will be discussed in the sequel. By the first two assumptions, the function f i will achieve minimum at 0. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can always make that the last assumption holds by adding a constant to f i to ensure f i (0) = 0 and f i (x) ≥ 0, which will not affect the properties of resilience as we will see later.
It is easy to check that the estimation (5) is translation invariant. In fact, ifx
which implies that g(y + Hu) − u =x * . We now investigate several commonly used estimators and show that they can be written as (5). 
2) Another example is an estimator that minimizes the sum of the l 1 norm of the residue, i.e.,
In the case where m i = n and H i = I n , ∀i, the estimate is a vector in which the ith entry is the median over the ith entries of all measurements y i s.
3) The following is designed to minimize the sum of the l 2 norm of the residue:
The optimal estimate in the case where m i = n and H i = I n , ∀i, is the geometric median of all y i s, which is called an L 1 estimator in [29] . In other words,x is the point in R n that minimizes the sum of Euclidean distances from y i to that point. 4) Pajic et al. [24] , [25] proposed the following resilient estimator in the presence of integrity attack:
where the authors assume that the noise is bounded and lies in a convex set Ω. However, this minimization problem involves zero norm, and thus is difficult to solve in general. A commonly adopted approach is to use L 1 relaxation to approximate zero norm, which leads to the following minimization problem:
Assuming that Ω is symmetric, i.e., w ∈ Ω ⇒ −w ∈ Ω, and can be written as a product set Ω = Ω 1 × · · · × Ω m , then the constraint on w can be decoupled as follows:
By the convexity of Ω, each Ω i must also be convex. We can define the following function:
As a result, the relaxed minimization problem can be written as follows:
5) Similar to the previous example, we can consider the following least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) [30] estimator:
If we define the following function:
Then, one can easily prove that the optimization problem (12) can be rewritten as follows:
In Section III, we shall present sufficient and necessary conditions for the resilience of the general estimator (5). Since (6)- (8) and (14) are all special cases of (5), we can easily analyze their individual resilience.
III. RESILIENCE ANALYSIS FOR A GENERAL ESTIMATOR
This section is devoted to the derivation of necessary and sufficient conditions for the resilience of the general estimator. Denote the compact set U {u ∈ R n : u = 1}. Before proceeding to the main results, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Let q : R → R be a convex function and q(0) = 0, then q(t)/t is monotonically nondecreasing on t ∈ R + . Moreover
Proof: For any 0 < α < 1, we have
Divide both sides by αt, we can prove that q(t)/t is monotonically nondecreasing. Therefore, q(t + 1)/(t + 1) ≥ q(t)/t, which implies (15) . As a consequence of the convexity of f i (tH i u) in terms of t and Lemma 1, we know that f i (tH i u)/t is monotonically nondecreasing on t ∈ R + . As a result, there are only following two possibilities.
1) f i (tH i u)/t is bounded by a function of u for all i and for all u, which implies that the limit lim t→∞ f i (tH i u)/t exists. 2) f i (tH i u)/t is unbounded for some i and u. The next lemma provides several important properties for the case where lim t→∞ f i (tH i u)/t exists, whose proof is reported in the appendix:
Lemma 2: If the following limit is well defined, i.e., finite,
then the following statements are true.
Then, the following pointwise limit holds:
Moreover, the convergence is uniform on any compact set of (u, v). iii) For any v and u, we have that
Remark 4: Intuitively speaking, one can interpret f i as a potential function and the derivative of f i as the force generated by sensor i (if it is differentiable). By (19) , we know that the force from the potential function f i along the u-direction cannot exceed C i (u) (or C i (u)/ u to normalize). On the other hand, (18) implies that this bound is tight.
We now give the sufficient condition for the resilience of the estimator.
Theorem 1 (Sufficient condition):
If the following conditions hold:
1) C i (u) is well defined for all u ∈ R n and all i ∈ S; and 2) the following inequality holds for all nonzero u:
then the estimator g is resilient.
Proof: Our goal is to prove that there exists a β(z) where β : R i m i → R, such that for any t ≥ β(z), u = 1, a ∈ A, the following inequality holds:
As a result, any point x ≥ β(z) + 1 cannot be the solution of the optimization problem since there exists a better point ( x − 1)x/ x . Therefore, we must have g(y) ≤ β(z) + 1 and hence the estimator is resilient.
Suppose the set of malicious sensors is I, to prove (21), we will first look at benign sensors. Due to the uniform conver-
, the following inequality holds:
for any u = 1. By (15), we can derive that
We fix δ to be
and take β(z) in the following form:
Notice that we write min u =1 instead of inf u =1 since C i (u) is continuous and the set {u : u = 1} is compact. Hence, the infimum is achievable, which further proves that δ > 0 is strictly positive. Hence, for i = 1, . . . , m, if t > β(z), we have
Since for good sensors, z i = y i , we know that
We now consider malicious sensors. By Lemma 2(iii), we know that for i ∈ I, and any u i∈I
Hence from (24), (26), and (27), we know that
which proves (21).
Remark 5:
A natural question after proving the resilience of an estimator is to quantify the resilience, i.e., by knowing μ(z) in (4). The constructive proof of Theorem 1 also sheds light on the derivation of a tight μ(z). From the proof, we know that μ(z) = β(z) + 1 where β(z) is dependent on the specific form of f i in (5).
Remark 6: In (28), we implicitly use the symmetric property of f i and we can relax that in a simply way. If f i is not symmetric, condition (20) will become i∈I C i (−u) < i∈I c C i (u), ∀I ∈ C. The results in the subsequent sections can also be adjusted for asymmetric f i similarly.
We next give necessary conditions for the resilience of the estimator.
Theorem 2 (Necessary condition I):
If C i (u) is well defined for all u ∈ R n and all i ∈ S, but there exist a unit vector u 0 and an index set I 0 ∈ C such that i∈I 0
then the estimator is not resilient to the attack. Proof: The resilience of the estimator is equivalent to that the optimal estimatex satisfies x ≤ μ(z) for all a ∈ A, where μ is a real-valued function. To this end, we will prove that for any r > 0, there exists an attack a such that allx that satisfy x ≤ r cannot be the optimal solution of (5). We will first look at the compromised sensors. For every δ > 0, we can always find a finite constant N i (δ) such that for anyx ∈ {x : x ≤ r} and for all t > N i , the following inequality holds:
The first inequality is derived from (15) . The second inequality is due to the uniform convergence of
and t = max i∈I 0 N i (δ) and y i = tH i u 0 for all i ∈ I 0 , then we know for any x ≤ r i∈I 0
Now, let us look at the benign sensors. By Lemma 2(iii), we have
From (30) and (31)
Thus, for such a y satisfying
x + u 0 is a better estimate than allx satisfying x ≤ r. Since r is an arbitrary positive real number, we can conclude that the estimator is not resilient.
Theorem 3 (Necessary condition II):
If there exist u 0 ∈ R n and i ∈ S such that
then the estimator is not resilient to the attack. Before proving Theorem 3, we need the following lemma whose proof is reported in the appendix.
Lemma 3: If there exist u 0 ∈ R n and i ∈ S such that condition (32) holds, for any M > 0 and for all v in a compact set V ⊂ R m i , there exists N (depending on M and the set V) such that the following inequality holds:
Now, we are ready to prove the theorem.
Proof: Similar to Theorem 2, we will prove that for any r > 0, there exists a y such that anyx that satisfies x ≤ r cannot be the optimal solution of (5).
We first look at any sensor i, where i = j. Since a continuous function achieves its supremum on a compact set, we know that the following supremum is well defined (not infinite):
which implies that for all x ≤ r, we can find M > 0, such that
Now, let us consider sensor j. Due to Lemma 3, we can find a t, such that for all x ≤ r, the following inequality holds:
Using Lemma 1, we have
Now, consider the following y:
Combining (34) and (35), we know that for all x ≤ r, the following inequality holds:
which implies that the optimal solution of (5) cannot be inside the ball {x : x ≤ r}. Now, since r > 0 is arbitrary, we know the estimator is not resilient.
Before continuing on, we would like to provide some remarks on the main result. First, it is worth noticing that the existence of a well-defined limit of f i (tH i u)/t is crucial for the resilience of g as Theorem 3 suggested. This implies that the LSE cannot be resilient since f i is in a quadratic form. Using the potential function and force analogies in Remark 4, one can interpret the results presented in this section as: the estimator g is resilient if the force generated by any sensor is bounded and if the combined force of any collection of p sensors is strictly less than the combined force of the remaining m − p sensors.
Second, one can see that the conditions proved in Theorem 1-3 are tight, with only a trivial gap where the left-hand side of (29) equals the right-hand side (RHS).
Finally, we want to remark on how to check inequality (20) . Consider the following set:
Condition (20) can be rewritten as follows:
Notice that since C i (u) is convex, E(I) is also convex. Suppose 
IV. SCALAR MEASUREMENT CASE
In this section, we specialize our results to the scalar measurement case, i.e., m i = 1, ∀i ∈ S. Throughout this section, we assume that the following limit is well defined (otherwise by Theorem 3, the estimator cannot be resilient):
We then have that
From Theorems 1 and 2, we have the following sufficient and necessary conditions for resilience of g.
Proposition 1: 1) If for all possible index set I and all nonzero u ∈ R n , the following inequality holds:
2) If there exists an index set I and a u ∈ R n such that the following inequality holds:
then the estimator g is not resilient. Remark 7: Note that in this special case of scalar measurements, the sufficient and necessary conditions resemble the wellknown nullspace property in compressed sensing and sparse signal recovery [31] . A similar result [23, Proposition 6] is also given for the decoding condition without any noise. In this paper, we prove a more general result, i.e., Theorems 1-3, regarding the resiliency of a large collection of estimators in the noisy case.
The main difficulty in Proposition 1 is to validate (38) or falsify (39) over all nonzero u s. We next show Proposition 1 in a more practically useful version when p is not large. Let ρ ∈ R p be a vector with all entries from {−1, 1} and D be the set of all possible ρ s. Note that the cardinality of D is 2 p . Theorem 4: Consider the following m p × 2 p optimization problems for any index set I ⊂ S with cardinality p and for any ρ ∈ D:
1) If the optimal values of the above-mentioned optimization problems are all strictly less than 1/2, then the estimator g is resilient.
2) If the optimal value of any one of the above-mentioned optimization problems is strictly larger than 1/2, then the estimator g is not resilient. Proof: Since C I u 1 = |C i 1 u| + · · · + |C i p u|, we know that the following two optimization problems are equivalent:
and
Due to C I u 1 + C I c u 1 = C S u 1 , we have
If for all u and I, the optimal value of (41) is strictly less than 1/2, from (38) and (43), we can conclude that g is resilient.
In a similar way, we can prove (b). Theorem 4(a) requires m p × 2 p enumerations of solving the optimization problem. In the next theorem, we propose more conservative but verifiable sufficient condition for resilience with computational complexity of m p . Theorem 5: If for any index set I ⊂ S with cardinality p, the optimal value of the following optimization problem is strictly less than 1:
Proof:
By enumerating all possible I, we conclude the proof.
Remark 8: Furthermore, notice that in Theorems 4 and 5, we only enumerate over all possible index set I with cardinality p. This is due to the reason that the solution of (41) is a nondecreasing function with respect to the index set I. Therefore, we do not need to enumerate index set I with cardinality strictly less than p. Similar argument can be made against (44).
Notice that (44) is not necessary. Since ξ = C I c u, ξ may not be able to take all possible values in R m −p . Similarly, we can find a more conservative necessary condition implied by Theorem 2. By enumerating all (C I , C I c ) and utilizing the following result, we can identify whether g is resilient for a given H or not.
Furthermore, notice that since C Corollary 1: If for any index set I ⊂ S with cardinality p, the following inequality holds:
Conversely, we have the following theorem. Theorem 6: If there exists an index set I with cardinality p such that the following inequality holds:
then the estimator g is not resilient.
The following lemma, whose proof is given in the appendix, is needed for the proof of Theorem 6.
Lemma 4: Let ξ ∈ R m such that ξ = ξ + ξ ⊥ , where ξ and ξ ⊥ are perpendicular to each other. Then the following inequality holds:
Moreover, the above inequality is achievable when
. . .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 6. Proof: To prove g is not resilient, from Proposition 1, we only need to show there exists a u such that which implies that
Since ξ belongs to the column space of C I c , there exists a u such that C I c u = ξ . Therefore, we can find a u such that
V. CORRELATED COST FUNCTION
In this section, we extend our model (5) by considering the following convex optimization based estimation problem:
Remark 9: If the noise w i s in system model (1) are correlated Gaussian random variables, the LSE takes the form of (48) where the term involving noise cannot be written into a form of summation. This inspires to extend our analysis to correlated cost function.
Then, we rewrite the estimator into a compact formx =g(y) whereg(·) is as follows:
Before we give the result on its resilience property, we present a useful lemma, which states that the optimalŵ in (48) is bounded given some condition. Moreover, we denote as λ i (Σ) s the eigenvalues of Σ and λ 1 (Σ) denotes the smallest eigenvalue of Σ.
Lemma 5: If C i (u) is well defined for all u ∈ R n and all i ∈ S, then the optimal minimizer ofŵ = w * to the problem (48) is bounded, i.e., there exists a finite number τ such that
where
and H †
i is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of H i .
Proof: We prove this by contradiction. Assume that w * > τ , and denote w * = tv where t = w * and v = w * /t and v = 1. If we can show that the objective function, denoted by J(w), in (48) atŵ = w * is larger than that atŵ = w 0 = (t − 1)v, we can prove the lemma.
To obtain the difference of the objective function atŵ = w * and w 0 , we have that
The first term in the first inequality is due to the fact that
where v[i] represents each element of vector v. The second term is due to Lemma 2(iii). The second inequality is due to t > τ. From the positive difference, we can see that w 0 is a better point than w * in terms of minimizing the objective function. Thus, any w, which does not satisfy (50), is not optimal.
We now give the sufficient condition for the resilience of the estimatorg.
Theorem 7 (Generalized sufficient condition):
If the following conditions hold: 1) C i (u) is well defined for all u ∈ R n and all i ∈ S; and 2) the following inequality holds for all nonzero u:
then the estimatorg is resilient.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, our goal is to prove that there exists a β(z) where β : R i m i → R, such that for any t ≥ β(z), u = 1, a ∈ A, the following inequality holds:
. As a result, any point x ≥ β(z) + 1 cannot be the solution of the optimization problem since there exists a better pointx 0 = ( x − 1)x/ x associated with the sameŵ. Therefore, we must have g(y) ≤ β(z) + 1 and hence the estimator is resilient. If given the optimalŵ * of the optimization problem on the RHS of (52), it is sufficient to show the following to prove (52):
Since we do not know what exactlyŵ * is but we know that ŵ * ≤ τ from Lemma 5, it is sufficient to show that there exists a β(z) where β : R i m i → R such that for any t ≥ β(z), u = 1, a ∈ A, and for all ŵ * ≤ τ , the following inequality holds:
First consider the set of benign sensors. Denote W {ŵ * : ŵ * ≤ τ }, which is a compact set. Due to the uniform convergence of h i (u, v, t) to C i (u) on U × W shown in Lemma 2, given any δ > 0, we can always find a finite constant N i (z i , τ, δ) where τ, δ) , the following inequality holds: for any u = 1. By (15), we can derive that
We fix δ as in (24) and take β(z) = max 1≤i≤m N i (z i , τ, δ). Then, similar to the derivation of (26) and (27) in the proof of Theorem 1, we can prove that
Remark 10: The work presented in this article can be extended to dynamic state estimation for linear time-invariant systems. For more details, please refer to [32] and [33] .
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we validate our main results on the IEEE 14-bus test system [34] . We simulate the state estimation against the (p, m)-sparse attacks under the dc power flow model. We extract the observation matrix H ∈ R 34×13 of the tested system from MATPOWER [35] . The state variables are voltage angles of all buses (excluding the slack Bus 1), and the scalar meter measurements are real power injections of all buses and real power flows of all branches. For the sake of space saving, we do not include the full H matrix here and we recommend interested readers to see [34] - [36] for details.
We use the estimator g described in (12) . By solving the optimization problem (13) explicitly, we know that f can be explicitly written as follows:
One can verify that C i (u) = |H i u|. According to Theorem 4, we find that g is not resilient when p ≥ 2. For instance, when p = 2, the experiments show that there are 29 pivotal pairs of sensors, out of all 561 possible pairs. The "pivotal pairs" mean that if the pair is simultaneously attacked, the estimator is no longer resilient. Due to the limited space, we list eight pairs in Table I , where BP i stands for the sensor measuring the real power flow of the ith branch 1 and BI i means the sensor measuring the real power injection of the ith bus.
We can also check the tightness of Theorems 5 and 6 that are actually more suitable for a large p. Based on Theorem 5, the experimental result shows that only when p = 1, the estimator 1 The branch indices follow MATPOWER [35] . g is resilient. On the other hand, when p ≥ 3, the estimator g is not resilient from Theorem 6. The only case that Theorems 5 and 6 cannot verify is when p = 2.
A. Tradeoff Between Efficiency and Resiliency
Next, we conduct experiments to compare the performance of the resilient estimator g in (14) with different tuning factors λ s and the LSE, under either normal operation or the attack. We will see the performance of g and the important role of λ, by tuning which we can achieve a desirable tradeoff between efficiency [mean square error (MSE) during normal operation] and resiliency (MSE during the attack). If attacked, the sensor monitoring the power flow of the fifth branch marked in red in Fig. 1 is assumed to be manipulated. Thus, we focus more on the state estimation of the voltage angles of Bus 2 and Bus 4 connected by the fourth branch. Each entry of the state vector x is assumed to be a uniform random variable in [0, 2π]. Moreover, we assume that the measurement noise is Gaussian distributed with zero mean and unit variance.
Normal Operation (see Fig. 2 ): Without any attacks, we plot MSE of the voltage angle of Bus 2 and Bus 4, and the total MSE of all buses versus λ, respectively. The solid curve in blue represents the MSE of LSE as a benchmark. Note that by increasing λ, we can improve the estimation performance of g until it approximately reaches the optimal MSE obtained by LSE.
Under the Attack (see Fig. 3 ): The sensor monitoring the power flow of the fourth branch is assumed to be manipulated (the nominal value changed to −10 4 ). The solid curve in blue represents the MSE of the oracle LSE that exactly knows the id of the attacked sensor and discards the corresponding measurement. The oracle LSE is impossible to implement in the sense that the bad data cannot be isolated with 100% accuracy. Even with the bad data detection scheme, the performance of the estimator cannot beat the performance of the oracle estimator. However, it provides a theoretically lower bound on the MSE for any resilient estimator. Notice that from Fig. 3 , there is an optimal λ for the estimation performance under the attack. On the other hand, the estimation performance under the normal operation is better with a larger λ. This requires us to design an appropriate λ to obtain a desirable tradeoff between the resiliency and efficiency of g.
B. Comparisons of Different Choices of Estimators
For different estimators discussed in Section II-B, we plot their MSE under the normal operation and under the attack in Fig. 4 . The y-axis represents the normalized MSE of an estimator in the presence of attacks, i.e., the quotient of MSE of g over the MSE of the oracle LSE. The x-axis represents the normalized MSE when there is no attack, by normalizing the MSE of g over the MSE of LSE.
The blue line in Fig. 4 represents the LASSO estimator (14) . Notice that when λ → 0, the LASSO estimator converges to the median estimator (7) and geometric median estimator (8) . From the curve, it can be seen that a good choice of λ is around 2.
The red line in Fig. 4 represents the estimator (9) . We choose the set as follows:
Notice that Pajic et al. proposed to use this estimator for the bounded noise scenario in [24] and [25] . However, in this paper, we prove that the estimator (9) is resilient to the attack even if the true w i is outside Ω i . Hence, in this simulation, we will use as a tuning parameter. The plot in red illustrates the efficiency and resiliency of the estimator (9) by varying . It is easy to see that for our simulation, the LASSO estimator outperforms the estimator (9) . However, it is still an open question what cost function f i should be chosen in order to achieve the optimal performance, which we would like to pursue as a future direction.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied the resilient estimation problem where sensor networks are exposed to (p, m)-sparse integrity attacks. The malicious measurements are assumed to be arbitrarily manipulated. No assumptions on the attack patterns and fault detection mechanism make us more focused on the properties of the inherent resilience of any estimator.
Our interest is not to study any concrete estimator in the presence of attacks. Instead, we have considered a general class of estimators that integrate a large number of important estimators as special cases and given sufficient and necessary conditions for the resilience of the estimator. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time to conduct the generic resilience analysis for cyber-physical systems. Moreover, we have presented more analytical results in the scalar measurement case to render the sufficient and necessary conditions more ready to use. The experimental results on the IEEE 14-bus test system validate our theoretical results and illustrate how to apply the theories to real applications.
Future works include the resilience analysis for the dynamical state estimation problem. How to elegantly design the f i s in (5) to satisfy different applications and requirements is another interesting open problem. The first inequality is due to the symmetry of f . Due to the scaling property of C i (u) and the convexity of f i , we have
Therefore, we know that C i is actually a seminorm on R n . 2) Based on the convexity of f i , we obtain
Dividing both sides of (57) and (58) by t and taking limit over t, we have 
Since lim t→∞ f i (−v)/t = lim t→∞ f i (2v)/t = 0, from (59) and (60), we have the following pointwise limit:
Notice that for a fixed (u, v), by Lemma 1, h(u, v, t) is monotonically nondecreasing with respect to t. Furthermore, C i (u) is continuous since it is a seminorm. Therefore, by Dini's theorem [37] , h(u, v, t) converges uniformly to C i (u) on a compact set of (u, v). 3) By the convexity of f i , for any integer k, we know that 
B. Proof of Lemma 3
From (32) and (57), it is easy to see that h j (u 0 , v, t) diverges to infinity for all v, i.e., h j (u 0 , v, t) → +∞.
Next, we will show that this divergence is also uniform. 
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Geometrically, ξ can be written as ξ = ξ/2 + r, where r ∈ {r : r 2 = ξ 2 /2}. As a result, we have The first inequality is due to the triangle inequality of any norm. The second and third inequalities are due to the fact that for an m-dimensional vector ξ
Without loss of generality, let us assume that ξ 1 = 1. The achievability of (47) is easy to verify.
